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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 39Abstract
The cost-of-￿nancing channel version of the ￿nancial accelerator proposed by Bernanke & Gertler [1989]
is prominent in the literature. Yet, this particular channel has not been validated by empirical work.
This paper presents an alternative version of the accelerator. This new accelerator, based on quantity
credit rationing, is shown to be more powerful than the traditional accelerator. By causing factor under-
utilization credit rationing generates an output gap persistent and sensitive to technology shocks. This
accelerator is not a substitute to the traditional mechanism though, but rather a complement. My
model helps improve the understanding of ￿nancial transmission mechanisms. It considers several types
of collaterals. Financial frictions generate persistence when collaterals take the form of tangible assets.
They generate ampli￿cation when collaterals take the form of cash ￿ows or when asset prices are variable.
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Numerous empirical studies demonstrate that balance sheet variables like liquidity ratios or leverage
ratios play a role in investment and inventory decisions (among others, Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen
[1988], Kashyap, Lamont, Stein [1994], Gertler & Gilchrist [1994]). The prominent explanation is due to
Bernanke & Gertler [1989], whose basic idea is the following. Because banks have no a priori information
about ￿rms (credit market is imperfect), they use balance sheet variables to evaluate ￿rms￿ ability to
repay their debt. The better the balance sheet, the higher the probability of repayment, and therefore the
lower the lending interest rate. According to this story, balance sheet variables play a role on investments
and inventories when the latter are sensitive to the lending rates.
However, that demand for investments or inventories is sensitive to interest rates ￿nds scant support
in most empirical work. In this paper I instead consider a ￿loan-supply￿ transmission channel. The
idea is that banks use the information from some ￿rm￿s balance sheet variables to decide whether they
￿nance this ￿rm at the market interest rate or not (so that some ￿rms get rationed). Consequently, in
the presence of credit rationing good balance sheets have a positive impact on investment and inventories
whatever the elasticity of the latter to the lending rate is.
Because credit conditions also depend positively on the economic activity (e.g. balance sheets are better
during expansions) a ￿virtuous circle￿ arises during expansions and, a contrario, a ￿vicious circle￿ arises
during recessions. The upshot is that credit market imperfections work to magnify and propagate to the
future the eﬀects of shocks to the economy. The principal conclusion of the present paper is that this
so-called ￿￿nancial accelerator￿ mechanism is particularly strong in the presence of credit rationing.
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From the 1930￿s Great Depression to the 1990￿s ￿nancial crises in Asia, there are numerous
examples that show how the ￿nancial sector aﬀects the business cycle. This is the view expressed
by the proponents of the ￿broad credit channel￿. These authors argue that frictions on the
￿nancial market act to magnify and propagate to the future the eﬀects of aggregate disturbances
and that the broad credit channel therefore constitutes a natural explanation of several major
stylized facts about business cycles. (Among these stylized facts is that the variance of output
and output growth autocorrelations are high in the data compared with that of the shocks
hitting the economy). The general mechanism that underlies the broad credit channel is known
as the ￿￿nancial accelerator mechanism￿. The prominent story behind the accelerator is due to
Bernanke & Gertler [1989]. It begins with the idea that ￿nancial market frictions (typically, a
costly state veri￿cation problem) drive a wedge between the cost of a ￿rm￿s external funds and
the market interest rate. The size of this wedge depends negatively on the ￿rm￿s creditworthiness,
which in turn depends partly on macroeconomic conditions. Aggregate disturbances do not only
alter the market rate but also the size of this wedge, in a way that ampli￿es the eﬀects of the
initial shock. This is especially true during recessions and for small (non-creditworthy) ￿rms,
who generally face high external ￿nance premia in bad times. According to this story, the
￿nancial accelerator mechanism is channelled to the economy through the lending interest rates.
As Kashyap, Lamont & Stein [1994, page 566] stressed, however, ￿there is one problem with
this story. Its basic premise ￿that ￿rms￿ investments and inventories are sensitive to interest
rates￿ ￿nds scant support in most empirical work￿. This result, on aggregate data, had been
widely documented in the literature (see, for example, Blanchard [1986] and the well-known
surveys of Blinder & Maccini [1991] and Chirinko [1993]). Bernanke & Gertler￿s accelerator is
not supported by empirical work at the disaggregate level either. For instance, Mojon, Smets
& Vermeulen [2001] recently concluded (page 15) that ￿there is no evidence that the interest
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policy interest rates￿. So where does this leave the broad credit channel? In my view, these
empirical results may say more about the inadequacies of the cost-of-￿nancing channel version
of the accelerator than about the inadequacies of the broad credit channel itself, for at least
two reasons. First, numerous studies ￿nd that ￿nancial variables (cash ￿ows, assets, coverage
ratio) have a signi￿cant in￿uence on inventories and investments, suggesting that interest rates
do a poor job of capturing changes in ￿￿nancial conditions￿1. In a recent and comprehensive
study, Strahan [1999] indeed shows that banks use both the price and non-price terms of loans
(commitment, co-signers, collaterals) as complements in dealing with borrower risk. Second,
some borrowers may face quantity rationing constraints of the sort described, for example, by
Stiglitz & Weiss [1981], and thus be unable to obtain funds at the observed lending interest
rate. This interpretation seems to be supported by empirical studies. For example, Sealey
[1979] concluded that U.S. business loans are essentially supply determined and, more recently,
Levenson & Willard [2000] found that 4.31% of the U.S. small businesses did not obtain the
funding for which they applied in 1987-19882. Several other papers also ￿nd indirect evidence
for quantity rationing (see McCallum [1991] and especially Kashyap, Stein & Wilcox [1993]).
The purpose of this paper is to bridge this gap between theory and facts. I present a new
￿nancial accelerator generated by quantity credit rationing instead of price credit rationing.
Like Jaﬀee & Stiglitz [1990], I de￿ne ￿price rationing￿ as a situation in which all borrowers get
the funds they desire, but at a rate that includes a positive external ￿nance premium. This
1See, for instance, the studies of Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen [1988], Kashyap, Lamont & Stein [1994], Gertler
& Gilchrist [1994], and Calomiris, Himmelberg & Wachtel [1995].
2Most empirical work on quantitative rationing dates back to the late 70￿s and the development of disequi-
librium econometrics. In his study of the U.S. loan market over the period 1952-77, Sealey reported that 66
quarters, of the 102 quarters in his sample, were associated with excess demand while only 36 indicated excess
supply. Using disequilibrium econometrics, Perez [2000] even found that about 60% of U.S. ￿rms did not get all
the credit they demanded in the 80s.
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contrast, I will speak of ￿quantity rationing￿ whenever some borrower￿s demand for credit is
turned down, even if this borrower is both willing and able to pay the interest rate of the loan
contract3.
The theoretical model presented in the paper has basically two components. First, in the
same spirit as most existing theoretical models on the ￿nancial accelerator4, I use a standard
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. Second, to introduce ￿nancial market im-
perfections, I use a simpli￿ed version of Hart & Moore [1994]￿s model (with a precommitment
problem on the credit market). Probably the papers closest to mine are Fuerst [1995] and
Carlstr￿m & Fuerst [1997]. The key diﬀerence with these papers is the modelling of quantity
rationing (I do not assume Costly State Veri￿cation) and the speci￿c ￿nancial transmission
channel which results from this. A related attempt to model quantitative credit rationing is
provided by Kiyotaki & Moore [1997]. There are two diﬀerences between the current paper and
theirs. First, I provide a measure of the intensity of credit rationing (in the Kiyotaki & Moore
approach credit rationing is in￿nite). Second, I use a standard real business cycle (RBC) frame-
work. These two features are important for they make it possible to compare between the new
and the traditional accelerators, and to confront the model to the widespread RBC literature.
The principal conclusion of this paper is that the ￿nancial accelerator is more powerful in
the presence of quantity rationing than in the presence of price rationing. My model generates
3It might be the case that the existence of a positive external ￿nance premium deters some ￿rms from partic-
ipating to the credit market (e.g. the debtor interest rate overcomes the gross rate of return of ￿rms￿ projects).
This is not what I call ￿price rationing￿ because it is not consistent with the story of Bernanke and Gertler I am
refering to. I borrowed the distinction between ￿price￿ and ￿quantity￿ rationings from Jaﬀee & Stiglitz [1990].
I use this distinction to facilitate the exposure, although one might consider that quantity rationing is the only
true de￿nition of rationing.
4See, among others, Bacchetta & Caminal [2000], Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist [1999], Carlstr￿m & Fuerst
[1997, 1998], Cooley & Nam [1998], Fuerst [1995].
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output growth displays positive autocorrelations at short horizons (persistence). It therefore
presents a solution to the hump-shaped response of output puzzle, which usually challenges the
RBC literature (Cogley & Nason [1995]). Also, it performs better than the existing theoretical
models on the ￿nancial accelerator, which exhibit either more ampli￿cation (Bernanke, Gertler
& Gilchrist [1999]) or more persistence (Carlstr￿m & Fuerst [1997]5) than the basic RBC model,
but not both. The intuition is the following. In my model, ￿rms produce with both ￿xed capital
and working capital and they must borrow from banks to purchase working capital (I will explain
this). However, because ￿rms cannot precommit to repay their loans, they face borrowing
constraints which prevent them from using all their production capacity in the equilibrium.
Capital under-utilization induces a gap between actual output and potential output (de￿ned
here as the output that would prevail in the absence of quantity rationing). To the extent that
credit rationing is high during recessions and low during expansions this gap is counter-cyclical.
Output is highly sensitive because not only potential output increases but also, and mainly,
because the output gap decreases following a positive technology shock.
Another innovation of the current work is to show that questions about persistence and
ampli￿cation are intimately connected to the composition of collaterals. In the literature, col-
laterals take the form of either cash ￿ows (Bernanke & Gertler [1989], Fuerst [1995], Carsltr￿m
& Fuerst [1997], Fisher [1999]) or tangible assets (Kiyotaki & Moore [1997], Bernanke, Gertler &
Gilchrist [1999]). In contrast, the present paper considers both. This feature makes it possible
to identify various ￿nancial transmission channels and to analyze the role of each inside the
accelerator mechanism. I ￿nd that persistence is imputable to the volume of tangible assets,
5In this paper, the hump-shaped response of output is imputable to an instantaneous increase in the lending
rate, which works to dampen the eﬀects of the positive technology shock. Indeed, as the authors say (page 907),
￿the foremost problem [of their model] is the [pro]cyclical behavior of bankruptcy rates and the risk premia￿.
This is a problem for two reasons. First, external ￿nance premia are observationally counter-cyclical. Second, the
￿nancial transmission mechanism they describe does not ￿tt h e￿nancial accelerator theory very well.
whereas ampli￿cation comes from cash ￿ows and asset prices.
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contracts and lays out the complete general equilibrium environment. Section 3 presents the
calibration, the analysis of the dynamics, and the quantitative evaluation of the accelerator.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
I consider a real economy with measure-one-continuums of households, banks, and ￿rms. Banks
and ￿rms are risk-neutral and competitive. All the agents are rational (perfect foresights) and
live in￿nitely. I index time by t. The sequence of events is summarized in Table 1.
Households take the main economic decisions (consumption and investment in capital goods).
These decisions take place as follows. First, at the end of period t, households accumulate
capital goods (kt+1), i.e. they create new capital goods (it) using consumption goods, with a
non-stochastic one-to-one transformation rate. They give these capital goods to the ￿rms, in
exchange for dividends at the end of period t +1(Πt+1) . F i r m sb e l o n gt oh o u s e h o l d sa n ds o
give the capital goods back to households at the end of period t +1 6. Once the capital goods
installed, capital good market closes (capital goods cannot be reallocated among ￿rms). Then
an economy-wide technology shock occurs, which is publicly observable and alters period t+1￿s
technology, at+1. Second, households provide ￿rms with their labour force (‘t+1), in exchange
for which they will get wages (wt+1)a tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt+1. Third, households consume goods
(ct) and make bank deposits (dt+1). The interest rate on bank deposits between t and t+1will
be denoted by rt+1. In order to have banks ￿and thereby intermediated ￿nance￿ exist in the
economy, I assume that households do not have the technology to store ￿nal goods and that only
banks do have it. It follows that households hold two kinds of assets: Tangible assets (capital
6The upshot of this assumption is that ￿rms start from fresh at every period and have no intertemporal
behavior. (Equivalently, I could have considered one period-lived ￿rms).
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more liquid than tangible assets because they are determined after the aggregate technology
shock. Second, the property of tangible assets is transferred from households to ￿rms, whereas
bank deposits remain the property of households. The idea here is to have tangible assets be
potential collaterals in the loan contracts between ￿rms and banks. Corollarily, like in Carlstr￿m
& Fuerst [1997], the model has the feature that the accumulation of collaterals is made by long-
lived agents.














ct + dt+1 + it 6 (1 + rt)dt + wt‘t + Πt
with it = kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt
(2)
where u is the instantaneous utility function of consumption and υ is the instantaneous disutility
function of labour (u and υ are well-behaved), Et = E(. | at,k t) is the expectation operator
conditional on the information available at the time households choose kt+1, β ∈ (0,1) is the
personal discount factor, and δ is the rate of depreciation of capital.
At the end of period t, ￿rms are identical, i.e. they are endowed with the same project,
the same technology, and the same quantity of capital. After the aggregate technology shock
occurred, they hire labour for period t +1 , ‘t+1. The combination of capital, labour, and
technology determines next period output, yt+1 = at+1kα
t+1‘1−α
t+1 . Then, deposit and labour
markets close and period t +1begins.
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1. Households choose the capital stock for next period (kt+1). Capital good market closes.
2. The aggregate shock on next period￿s technology occurs (at+1).
3. Firms hire labour for next period (‘t+1).
4. Households make their consumption and bank deposit decisions (ct and dt+1).
5. Labour and deposit markets close. Period t ends.
6. Period t+1 starts. Credit market opens. The idiosyncratic shocks are realized (ν).
7. Firms demand bank loans (φt+1(ν)) .T h ec r e d i tm a r k e tc l o s e s .
8. Those ￿rms who got funds from banks produce (yt+1).
So far the model is a very standard RBC model in the same vein as, for instance, Kydland
& Prescott [1982] and King, Plosser & Rebelo [1988]. I need further assumptions to introduce
bank loans. So I assume that the ￿rms need also a certain quantity φt+1 of ￿nal goods at the
beginning of period t+1to start producing7. Since only banks have the ￿n a lg o o d si nh a n da t
the beginning of period t+1, ￿rms will have to go on the credit market to purchase these goods.
To stress the diﬀerence between the ￿nal goods consumed by households and these ￿nal goods
used by ￿rms, I will refer to the latter as ￿intermediate goods￿ or ￿working capital goods￿ in the
rest of the paper. φt+1 is supposed to be proportional to the size of the ￿rm and independent
of the productivity parameter: φt+1 = νkα
t+1‘1−α
t+1 ,w i t hν ∈ [0,1]. T og a i ni ng e n e r a l i t yIw i l l
assume that ￿rms are heterogenous, in the sense that every ￿rm has her own parameter ν. More
7One somehow natural alternative is to assume a ￿cash-in-advance￿-type constraint on salaries, the idea being
that ￿rms must have ￿nal goods in hand at the beginning of period t +1in order to pay the wage bill at the
end of period t +1(see, for example, Christiano & Eichenbaum [1992]). I did not make this choice because, for
comparison purpose, I wished to avoid having the capitalistic intensity diﬀer from the basic RBC model. This
point is not crucial in the model. As it will become clear later, what is important, though, is to have ￿nancial
frictions aﬀect the short-run productive capacity of the economy (i.e. working capital) and thereby generate
capital under-utilization. This supply-side approach of the ￿nancial transmission mechanism is consistent with
the recent empirical work of Barth & Ramey [2000].
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the following, I will refer to ￿rm ν as the ￿rm who got the shock ν and I will denote by φt+1(ν)
the amount of external funds she needs. To gain in tractability, and following the suggestion of
Gertler [1995], I will also suppose that φt+1(ν) is lumpy: If the ￿rm ν does not pay this cost,
then she cannot produce (see footnote 11 for a discussion). Idiosyncratic shocks occur at the
beginning of period t +1and are publicly observable.
I assume that credit contracts are intraperiodic. To keep the model as simple as possible and
to avoid having multiple credit market equilibria, I do not allow for multiperiodic contracts9.
At the beginning of period t +1 ,b a n k sg i v e￿rm ν the φt+1(ν) units of working capital goods
she demands against her promise to repay (1 + rt+1)φt+1(ν) units of ￿nal goods at the end of
period t+1(competition on the credit market makes banks require only the break-even interest
rate rt+1). I introduce credit market frictions by supposing that such a promise may not be
credible. As in Kiyotaki & Moore [1997], I assume that ￿rms have always the freedom to go
away without honoring their debt. In the language of Hart & Moore [1994], the ￿rms￿ outcomes
are inalienable so that ￿rms are unable to precommit to repay their debt10. Banks know this
8I make no speci￿ca s s u m p t i o no nF (excepted that F(0) > 0, F(1) = 1,a n dF
0
(ν) > 0 ∀ν ∈ [0,1]). If
F(.)=1[v,1](.) then ￿r m sh a v ea l lt h es a m eν,w i t hν = ν. The introduction of ￿rm heterogeneity will make it
possible to discuss the role of the distribution of risks on the ￿nancial transmission mechanism.
9This assumption is also present, for instance, in Carlstr￿m & Fuerst [1997] and Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist
[1999], as these authors assume ￿enough anonymity￿ on the credit market (i.e. lenders loose track of borrowers
after every period).
10Hart & Moore [1994] consider the inalienability of entrepreneurs￿ human capital instead of entrepreneurs￿
assets. Several other types of market frictions may generate credit rationing. In a former version of the paper, I
considered an adverse selection problem (￿l aBesanko & Thakor [1987]) instead of a precommitment problem.
One could also consider a moral hazard problem (e.g. Williamson [1987]). The spirit and the results of the model
are not fundamentally aﬀected by what causes credit rationing. I chose a precommitment problem to keep the
modelling simple. Note that households are by assumption not aﬀected by the precommitment problem because
they own the ￿rms. Also, because they are risk-adverse, households strictly prefer to capitalize all the ￿rms ex
ante (rather than only one ￿rm) in order to obtain a certain ￿nancial income.
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exceed the value of ￿rms￿ collateral. I assume that banks can get back only a fraction ￿ ∈ (0,1]
of ￿rms￿ cash ￿ow, yt+1,a sw e l la so n l yaf r a c t i o nγ ∈ (0,1] of ￿rms￿ capital stock (net of its
depreciation rate), (1−δ)kt+1. The total value of collaterals is thus γ(1−δ)kt+1 +￿yt+1.O n l y

















The other ￿rms are credit constrained, cannot aﬀord the working capital goods and are unable
to activate their project. For these ￿rms, credit rationing generates factor under-utilization.
(Note that households are interested in selling these ￿rms to banks at this time since banks
would then own ￿rms and the precommitment problem would vanish. However, my assumption
that the capital market closes before period t+1starts rules this case out). The crucial variable
here is νt+1, which has two connected interpretations. First, it corresponds to ￿rms￿ leverage
ratio. Second, 1−F(νt+1) corresponds to the intensity of credit rationing11. The latter depends
negatively on the capital stock (kt+1), the productivity parameter (at+1), and it depends pos-
itively on the interest rate (rt+1) and labour (‘t+1). The reason why credit rationing is high
when capitalistic intensity is low is that capital is a collateralizable asset (unlike labour) and is
a more valuable input than labour from banks￿ point of view. Inputs therefore play two roles
in the economy: A productive role and a ￿nancial role. Capital tends to improve ￿nancing con-
11Note that the assumption that investments in working capital are lumpy has no crucial eﬀect in the model
and that quantity rationing would exist even without it. Indeed, assume that entrepreneurs￿ projects are divisible:
Since the entrepreneur ν can aﬀord only a fraction νt+1/ν of the working capital he needs, then he can use only
af r a c t i o nνt+1/ν of his production capacity. Entrepreneurs ν ∈ [0,νt+1] would still produce yt+1 (they are fully
￿nanced) but entrepreneurs ν ∈]νt+1,1] would produce only
νt+1
ν yt+1 (instead of 0 i nt h ec a s eo fl u m p i n e s s ) .I t




ν dF(ν) w h i c hi si n d e e dl o w e rt h a n1 − F(νt+1)
but still strictly positive. Note further that short term investment￿s lumpiness is consistent with a number of
empirical studies (e.g. Cooper & Haltiwanger [1994]).
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exist between ￿nancing conditions and factor demands. On the one hand, ￿nancing conditions
depend on productive factors. On the other hand, credit rationing lowers the returns on capital
and labour so that factor demands depend positively on the ￿nancing conditions (see Table 2).
To simplify the model, I will assume that neither households nor ￿rms internalize the eﬀect of
factor demands on ￿nancing conditions (they take νt+1 as given)12.
The representative ￿rm￿s objective at the end of period t merely consists in maximizing her
expected instantaneous pro￿t by hiring the optimal number of workers (for t +1)a n dc h o o s i n g




Πt+1 =[ F(νt+1)at+1 − E(νt+1)(1 + rt+1)]kα
t+1‘1−α
t+1 − wt+1‘t+1 (4)
where E(ν) ≡
R ν
0 νdF(ν). Firms are in position to lever funds from banks with probability
F(νt+1). Hence, the ex post aggregate output (Yt+1)i se q u a lt oYt+1 = F(νt+1)at+1kα
t+1‘1−α
t+1
12This assumption is not crucial in the model. It simpli￿e se q u a t i o n s5a n d6i nT a b l e2 ,a sw e l la st h e
mechanisms behind the dynamics of the economy. In a previous version of the paper I found that this assumption
had only second order eﬀects. Absent this assumption, the capital stock would be slightly higher and labour lower
at the steady state and the dynamics of the economy would hardly diﬀer. The reason why the capital stock would
be higher is the following (a symmetric argument holds for labor). Should households internalize the ￿nancial
role of capital, they would increase their capital stock in order to lessen ￿rms￿ borrowing constraints. Households
are constrained from raising the size of the ￿rms inde￿nitely by the fact that capital has decreasing marginal
returns. They would actually increase their capital stock only until the gain from lessening borrowing constraints
was oﬀset by the loss due to the decrease in marginal productivity. Interestingly, capital would have a shadow
(endogenous) price in this case. Notably, because households have always the possibility to produce capital goods
at unit cost and capital plays also a ￿nancial role, the market price of capital would be below 1 and pro-cyclical.
13Wages are paid even by ￿rms who do not get bank loans, because these ￿rms can always liquidate their capital
stock to do so. Alternatively, I could assume that wages are paid by the ￿nanced ￿rms only. This would not
alter the general equilibrium (excepted wt) if one assumed that every household supplies all ￿rms equally with
his labour force (i.e. if there is no uncertainty about labour incomes).
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t+1‘1−α
t+1 .S i n c eF(ν) > E(ν) ∀ν ∈ [0,1],
as u ﬃcient condition to make sure that all the projects have a strictly positive expected net
present value is at+1 > 1+rt+1. In the rest of the paper, I will assume that βa>1 to have this
condition ful￿lled in the neighborhood of the steady state14.
Table 2 ￿ Equations of the Model
1. u0(ct)=βEt(1 + rt+1)u0(ct+1)
2. Yt = ct + it + E(νt+1)kα
t+1‘1−α
t+1
3. Yt = F(νt)atkα
t ‘1−α
t
4. it = kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt
5. [F(νt)at − E(νt)(1 + rt)]αkα−1
t ‘1−α
t = rt + δ

















The recursive general equilibrium is de￿ned by decisions rules for kt+1, ct, Yt, it, νt, rt,a n d
‘t, where these decision rules are stationary functions of (kt,a t) and satisfy the equations of
Table 2. If ￿rms do not experience the idiosyncratic shocks (F(.) ≡ 1ν∈[0,1](.) ⇒ E(.) ≡ 0)
then the model collapses to the textbook RBC model. Equation 2 is the ￿nal good market
equilibrium condition. (Aggregate demand has three components: Consumption, investment,
and intermediate goods). The labour market implicitly clears, wt = −υ0(‘t)/u0(ct),a sw e l la s
the loanable funds market, dt+1 = E(νt+1)kα
t+1‘1−α
t+1 (Walras￿ law applies). Equation 3 expresses
the gap between actual output, Yt,a n d￿rms￿ production capacity, yt.T h e l a t t e r m a y a l s o
be interpreted as the potential aggregate output, i.e. the aggregate output that would prevail
in the absence of quantity rationing. When the leverage ratio is lower than one (equation 7)
then Yt <y t and borrowing constraints induce an output gap equal to a fraction 1 − F(νt) of
potential output. Equations 5 and 6 are the ￿rst order conditions for ￿xed capital and labour
14Non time-indexed variables will denote steady state values.
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that F(νt)at − E(νt)(1 + rt) is increasing in νt). The reason is the following. At the time they
choose kt and ‘t,h o u s e h o l d sa n d￿rms anticipate that only a fraction F(νt) of the projects will
be funded (they perfectly foresee the credit market equilibrium). As a result, if the leverage
ratio is low, then factor under-utilization will be high, the return on capital and labour will be
low, as well as factor demands.
Quantity versus Price Rationing
There is one key diﬀerence between the current model and the models in which the ￿nancial
accelerator is generated by price rationing. In the latter models, the existence of an external
￿nance premium hinders ￿xed capital investment. Given this premium, however, the capital
stock is optimal and there is no capital under-utilization. In contrast, credit rationing implies
both under-investment (equations 5 and 6 in Table 2) and factor under-utilization (equation
3) and, ex post, households wish they had not invested capital in the rationed ￿rms. Factor
under-utilization is an additional eﬀect that enhances the traditional mechanism.
To detail the diﬀerent mechanisms at work and to compare them with those already present
in the literature (e.g. Bernanke & Gertler [1989], Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist [1999]), I need
to introduce additional notations. First, I introduce an ￿implicit external ￿nance premium￿,
et,w h i c hId e ￿ne as the ￿ctive premium that would generate the same factor demands in the






E(1) > 1. This premium depends negatively
on ￿rms￿ balance sheet (νt) and is equal to zero when νt =1 . Second, I refer to ft ≡ kα
t ‘1−α
t as
factor demands, so that the aggregate output simply writes Yt = F(νt)atft (from equation 3 in
Table 2). Given equations 5 and 6 in Table 2 and the de￿nition of the implicit premium, ft is
15More precisely, et is such that the ex ante gross return on investment in the economy with quantity rationing,
F(νt)at − E(νt)(1 + rt), is equal to the one that would be in an economy with price rationing (where all ￿rms
obtain funds), F(1)at − E(1)(1 + rt)(1 + et). See equations 5 and 6 in Table 2. Further details are given in
appendix.
ECB • Working Paper No 87 • November 2001 17af u n c t i o nf(at,e t) which depends positively on at and negatively on et(νt). The equation (5)
below decomposes the instantaneous response of output to a technology shock into three terms:
∂Yt
∂at























This equation summarizes the main transmission mechanisms at work in the model. Basically,
three distinctive forces drive aggregate output: The ￿perfect credit market￿ force, the ￿pseudo-
price rationing￿ force, and the ￿quantitative rationing￿ force. The ￿rst two terms on the right-
hand-side of equation (5) represent the variation in actual output due to the variation in potential
output. More precisely, the ￿rst term on the right hand side, which I call the ￿perfect credit
market￿ eﬀect, corresponds to the variation of the aggregate output that would prevail in a
perfect credit market situation (no precommitment issue)16. The second eﬀect corresponds to
the change in potential output due to the change in the leverage ratio. This eﬀect is not direct to
the extent that it relies on two elasticities. First, it depends on the elasticity of factor demands
to ￿nancing conditions (through the term f
0
2(at,e t)). Second, it depends on the elasticity of
￿nancing conditions to balance sheet variables (through e
0
t(νt)). I call this eﬀect the ￿pseudo-
price rationing￿ eﬀect because it is very comparable with the eﬀect generated by models based
on the external ￿nance premium. In particular, as in Bernanke & Gertler [1989], Cooley & Nam
[1998], Fuerst [1995] and others, this eﬀect generates under-investment. I will show in section 3.2
that the main in￿uence of credit rationing on output ￿uctuations does not go through changes
in under-investment though. Rather, it goes through changes in factor under-utilization (term
F
0
(νt) in the right-hand side). I call this latter eﬀect the ￿quantity credit rationing￿ eﬀect
because it is directly linked to the rationing behavior of banks and is independent of the elasticity
of factor demands to ￿nancing conditions. (For this reason, the accelerator presented in this
paper can be viewed as a (credit) supply-side eﬀect, in contrast with the (credit) demand-side
16Stricto sensu, the true ￿perfect credit market￿ eﬀect is ft + atf
0
1(at,e t).
eﬀect of Bernanke and Gertler).
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The purpose of this section is twofold. First, I will analyze the dynamics of the model. I will
compare it with the dynamics of the frictionless model, which I will use as a benchmark. This
perfect information case corresponds to the model described in Table 2 when parameters ￿
and/or γ are high enough to make the precommitment problem vanish (νt =1∀t). As shown in
the appendix the dynamic behavior of such a model is close to the standard RBC model. In what
follows, I will consider a non-anticipated and positive shock on parameter at, which I will refer to
as a technology shock. I will assume that the logarithm of at follows a one order autoregressive
process with root ρ. The second purpose of this section is to provide a quantitative evaluation
of the ￿nancial accelerator. By doing so, I will show that the broad credit channel theory can
help explain why aggregate output has a high variance and why output growth presents positive
autocorrelations at short horizons.
3.1 Calibration
Where I can, I set parameters according to their values in the business cycle literature. I also
assume that the model generates quarterly data. Consequently, I set the discount factor (β),
the capital￿s share (α), the depreciation rate (δ), and the autoregressive root (ρ)a sf o l l o w s :
Table 3 ￿ Standard Parameters
βα δ ρ
0.98 0.36 0.025 0.9
Household preferences are given by u(c)=l n ( c) and υ(‘)=ηln(1 − ‘). The parameter η is
set to 0.1 to have labour supply elasticity be consistent with the empirical Labour Economics
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distribution function for F(ν)18. The value of parameter a is set to 1.2 so that the gross rate of
return of the project (a−ν(1+r)) is approximately equal to 20% for the ￿rm ν =1and to 70%
for the average ￿rm. Calibration is more delicate for the non-standard parameters γ and ￿ to
the extent that the dynamics of the economy with credit rationing is very sensitive to them. For
example, if γ is high and ￿ =0then the collateral is a fraction γ of the capital stock and inherits
capital￿s sluggishness. If, in contrast, γ =0and ￿ is high then the collateral is a fraction ￿ of the
expected cash ￿ow and will be very sensitive to the technology shock. So in the numerical analysis
I will consider three sets of parameters, which will make it possible to discuss how dynamics is
connected to collaterals: (γ,￿)=( 0 .18,0), (γ,￿)=( 0 ,0.8) and (γ,￿)=( 0 .15,0.15). (Changes
in the standard parameters of Table 3 have well known implications so I will not consider them).
In these three cases γ and ￿ are set in order to have the rate of capacity utilization equal 95% at
the steady state19. The average U.S. rate of capacity utilization has been around 81% since the
early 60s. Nevertheless, because capacity under-utilization may also ￿nd its origin in demand
or price stickiness, which I abstracted from, I found it acceptable to retain F(ν)=0 .95.A l s o ,
this parametrization is consistent with the ￿ndings of Levenson & Willard [2000] that about 5%
of small U.S. ￿rms are credit constrained.
3.2 Dynamic Analysis
I consider a shock to aggregate productivity: The parameter at rises by 1% above its steady
state value. The equilibrium conditions in Table 2 are linearized about the steady state and I
used the standard method of simulation. Figures 1A-1H report the step-by-step analysis of the
17In the literature, labour supply elasticity ranges from −0.10 for men to 0.7 for women. It equals 0.13 in my
benchmark model.
18Section 3.3 provides some sensitivity analysis to help assess the role of the distribution function on the
dynamics.
19The upshot of this calibration is that the steady states will be identical in the three cases, as well as the
welfare losses that markets frictions generate.
dynamics for the frictionless economy and for the three credit-constrained economies.
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productivity increases, then each series slowly returns to normal as productivity starts declining
back to its steady state. As Cogley and Nason [1995] demonstrate, the dynamics of investment,
labour, and output are all inherited from the autocorrelation structure of the technology shock.
Capital adds little propagation to these variables in and of itself.
In the presence of credit rationing, the dynamics is diﬀerent. Let me consider the polar
case (γ,￿)=( 0 .18,0) ￿rst. In this case, ￿rms can precommit to repay at most 18% of their
capital stock, which is the only collateral. On impact, investment and labour demands go
up. Improvement in technology and rises in factor demands cause an increase in potential
and actual outputs. The latter is weaker than in the benchmark economy though. This is
because factor under-utilization (the output gap) goes up and partly oﬀsets the variation in
the potential output. The output gap increases because more ￿rms face credit rationing. The
reason why ￿rms￿ external ￿nancing conditions deteriorate is clear given equation 7 in Table
2. As labour and the interest rate increase, the leverage ratio falls because the capital stock is
predetermined. Every ￿rm needs a higher loan but less ￿rms get the loan. Also, less ￿rms can
aﬀord activating their project and factor under-utilization increases. Subsequently, ￿nancing
conditions start improving as the capital stock adjusts to technology. The output gap shrinks,
passing below its steady state level three quarters after the shock. Driven by the output gap,
aggregate output keeps rising ten quarters after the shock. Thereby, the model exhibits a hump-
shaped response of output which is consistent with the ￿ndings of Cogley & Nason [1995]. At
this point, the economic dynamics has a pattern very similar to that in Carsltr￿m & Fuerst
[1997]: Credit market imperfections do generate persistence but do not generate ampli￿cation.
As Carlstr￿m and Fuerst explained, the reason is that external ￿nancing conditions deteriorate
instantaneously and so work to dampen the business ￿uctuations at the impact. As a result,
ECB • Working Paper No 87 • November 2001 21with this calibration, ￿nancial frictions generate a decelerating eﬀect, which does not ￿tt h e
￿nancial accelerator theory well.
Insert Figure 1
The obvious reason why the model (γ,￿)=( 0 .18,0) fails to generate ampli￿cation is that
collateral is too sluggish relatively to the demand for working capital. To understand this better
it is worth investigating the opposite case, (γ,￿)=( 0 ,0.8).I nt h i sc a s e ,￿rms can precommit
to repay at most 80% of their future cash ￿ow, which is the only collateral. On impact, again,
investment and labour go up and drive potential output above its steady state level. The new
point here is the soar of the aggregate output by almost 2% above its steady state level (against
1.2% in the benchmark model and 0.95% in the ￿rst polar case). This sharp increase in output
is imputable to the decrease in the output gap. The reason why the output gap diminishes is the
opposite reason why it increased in the previous case. When the collateral incorporates only the
expected cash ￿ow it adjusts more rapidly to the technology shock than the demand for working
capital. As a result, the leverage ratio increases, credit constraints relax and factor under-
utilization decreases instantaneously. The model￿s dynamics hereafter mirrors the benchmark
dynamics. The good point of this model is that it contains a strong ampli￿cation channel,
which is partly consistent with the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism. Its caveat is that there is
no persistence any longer.
Insert Figure 2
Clearly, both capital and expected cash ￿ow must be part of collaterals to get both persistence
and ampli￿cation. So I also considered the case (γ,￿)=( 0 .15,0.15).T h i s m o d e l c a n b e
viewed as the ￿mean￿ of the two polar models described above. On impact, the demand for
working capital increases. Although the capital stock is predetermined, the leverage ratio rises
because the expected cash ￿ow goes up. Consequently, external ￿nancing conditions improve,
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the benchmark economy. External ￿nancing conditions keep improving even after the shock
because the rise in the capital stock drives the leverage ratio up. The consequence is a persistent
decrease in the output gap, which oﬀsets the return of potential output back to its steady state.
In this case, aggregate output keeps rising until the fourth quarter after the initial shock, and
i t sr e s p o n s ei sb o t ha m p l i ￿ed and persistent.
3.2.1 Quantity Rationing versus Price Rationing
It is natural to compare the new accelerator with the traditional accelerator described by
Bernanke & Gertler [1989]. For this I use the claim of section 2 that potential output￿s sensitivity
to ￿nancing conditions is assimilable to a price rationing eﬀect, whilst output gap￿s sensitivity
is a speci￿c outcome of quantity rationing. Hence, the comparison between the two accelera-
tors consists merely in the comparison between the responses of potential and actual outputs.
Figures 1A, 1C, and 1D show that the conclusion is unambiguous (Figure 2 also illustrates this
point20). Sensitivity and persistence of aggregate output are mainly due to the output gap and
to the borrowing constraints that induce it. Consistently with the literature (Fuerst [1995],
Fisher [1999]), the traditional accelerator is almost insigni￿cant whatever the composition of
collaterals is. In the case (γ,￿)=( 0 .18,0), notably, the response of potential output (Figure
1C) is very similar to the response of output in Fuerst [1995] (his Figure 2C)21.
20Figure 2 reports the dynamics of output generated by a chronicle of 200 independent technology shocks in the
benchmark model and in the model with quantity rationing. These shocks are N(0,1) and I used the parameters
of Table 3 and (γ,￿)=( 0 .15,0.15). The economy with price rationing refers to the ￿ctive economy described in
the appendix. The large gap between the grey line and the bold line corresponds to the output gap, and therefore
to the speci￿ce ﬀect of quantity rationing. The small diﬀerence between the grey line and the thin line comes
from the implicit external ￿nance premium.
21This is because the elasticity of the demand for working capital to credit conditions ￿upon which the
traditional accelerator relies￿ is weak. See Fuerst [1995, page 1331], and also Fisher [1999, page 201]f o ra n
insightful discussion on the link between investment/interest rate elasticity and the importance of the (traditional)
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3.2.2 Accelerator and ￿Dynamic Multiplier￿
Figures 3A-3B report the dynamics of the actual and the output gap when households face
quadratic capital adjustment costs on investment. Now, households must use (1+0.5κit)it units
of ￿nal goods to get it units of capital goods; I will consider κ =0 .5.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e p r i c e
of capital, denoted by qt, is variable and equal to 1.1 in the steady state. As in Kiyotaki &
Moore [1997] and Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist [1999], the idea is to have asset price variability
contribute to volatility in ￿rms￿ leverage ratio. One thus gets:














Following a persistent positive technology shock, households anticipate a rise in future cash ￿ows
and accumulate more capital goods at the impact. This entails an increase in the price of capital
and therefore an increase in the leverage ratio. In this case, increases in expected future cash
￿ows improve the current external ￿nancing conditions and stimulate the economy at the date
of the shock. Basically, this is the kind of dynamic feedback that Kiyotaki & Moore [1997] call
the ￿dynamic multiplier￿.
How powerful is this asset prices channel compared with the static mechanism I have de-
scribed so far? To answer this question, I considered ￿ve cases in Figures 3A-3B. The ￿rst two
cases correspond to the frictionless economy and to the economy with credit rationing (with
parameters (γ,￿)=( 0 .15,0.15)). In the other cases, I simulated the model holding two of the
collateral￿s components (qt, kt and at) constant each time22.T h e￿ o n l yqt￿ case shows that the
rise in qt does play a speci￿c and important role in the dynamics. Consistently with Kiyotaki &
accelerator.
22Given equation 7 in Table 2 the linearized dynamics of νt can be written : b νt = εqb qt+εkb kt+εab at−εrb rt−ε‘b ‘t
where b xt denotes the deviation of variable x from its steady state and εx is the elasticity of the leverage ratio to
x.T h ec a s e￿ qt only￿, for example, corresponds to output￿s dynamics when εk and εa are arbitrarily set to zero.
ECB • Working Paper No 87 • November 2001 24Moore [1997] and Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist [1999], output is more volatile when the price
of tangible assets is variable. However, the asset prices transmission channel does not appear to
be particularly stronger than the cash ￿ow channel (compare the ￿only qt￿ case with the ￿only
at￿ case). It is also unable to generate the hump shape. The reason is that all agents in the
e c o n o m yi n t e r n a l i z ea l lt h er i s ei nf u t u r ec a s h￿ows at the impact and therefore react instan-
taneously. It follows that asset prices variability does help RBC models generate ampli￿cation
but not persistence.
3.3 Quantitative Analysis
Many RBC models have weak internal propagation mechanisms which do not generate interesting
dynamics in their internal structure. As a result they fail to replicate several major stylized facts
about business cycles. Among these failures is that output presents a lower variance and output
growth presents lower autocorrelations than in the data (see Table 4). The aim of this section is
to quantify the new ￿nancial accelerator and to show how the incorporation of quantity rationing
may help RBC models replicate these stylized facts. Also, the proponents of the broad credit
channel claim that ￿nancial frictions can explain the observed dynamics of output. So I will use
the variance of output and the autocorrelation function (ACF) of output growth as measures of
the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism23.
Table 4 reports the statistics for the U.S. economy between 1960:1 and 2000:4, the basic RBC
model (F ≡ 1ν∈[0,1]), the benchmark, and the economy with credit rationing when γ = ￿ =0 .15
(this latter economy corresponds to Figures 1A-1H). The third row shows that the benchmark
model behaves like the basic RBC model (see also Figures A1-A6 in the appendix). Consistently
with Figure 1A, the last row reports that the presence of tangible assets in collaterals works
to increase persistence. Output growth￿s ￿rst autocorrelations are positive and higher than in
23To my knowledge, the only paper that provides a measure of the accelerator is Carlstr￿m & Fuerst [1997].
However, their measure is partial to the extent that only the ACF is considered.
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accelerator theory is that the variance of output is higher in the economy with credit rationing.
The incorporation of quantity rationing into the standard RBC model thus helps replicate the
observed dynamics of output. The statistics of the model with credit rationing in Table 4 remain
lower than the observed statistics though. In what follows I show how one can very improve the
quantitative ￿t of the model.
Table 4 ￿ Actual Data and Theoretical Models24
ACF for output growth
σY γ1 γ2 γ3
U.S. data 0.016 0.298 0.200 0.093
RBC 0.009 -0.030 -0.029 -0.028
Benchmark 0.009 -0.020 -0.021 -0.023
CR I 0.011 0.034 0.026 0.017
The last term in equation (5) suggests that there are basically two ways to improve the model:
By increasing the leverage ratio￿s sensitivity to the macroeconomy (∂νt/∂at), or by increasing
the sensitivity of the macroeconomy to the leverage ratio (F
0
(νt)25). The ￿rst way is perhaps the
most direct. It merely consists in varying the composition of collaterals in the appropriate way.
As I have shown in the previous section, make the capital price vary is one possibility. Another
possibility is to consider ￿complementarities￿ between the components of collaterals, the idea
24I averaged the statistics on 500 simulations for which the feasability condition νt < 1 were satis￿ed all periods
in models CR I and CR II-III (cf. Table 5). Each simulation was 300 periods in length, and the statistics were
calculated only over the last 200 periods. The standard deviation of the aggregate technology shock was equal to
the standard 0.007 and I used the parameters of Table 3. The variance was calculated for the HP-￿ltered (actual
and simulated) series of output. The data were not ￿ltered for the ACF growth statistics.




t(νt)) as well. I do not consider
this case because this would require varying the standard parameters of the model (Table 3).
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￿ = ￿(kt) (with ￿
0
(kt) > 0)26. Although insightful, such alterations have quite straightforward
outcomes so, for the sake of parsimony, I will not report the corresponding statistics. More
interesting is the second way (increase the sensitivity of the economy to the leverage ratio).
This consists in varying the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, F. To illustrate the discussion I
will consider the following distribution functions: Fp(ν)=ν1+p,w i t hp ∈ (−1,+∞), and several
p27.
Insert Figure 4
The strength of the accelerator depends positively on the capacity utilization rate￿s elasticity
to the leverage ratio (see equation (5)). In particular, for a given leverage ratio, the higher
p, the higher the slope of the risk distribution, and the stronger the ￿nancial accelerator. In
other words, the ￿nancial accelerator depends on the distribution of risks28. The intuition is
the following. When the slope of F is high at the steady state the number of ￿on-the-edge￿
26Such a complementarity can be justi￿e db yt h ef a c tt h a ti ti sp r o b a b l ym o r ed i ﬃcult for large ￿rms














. The present model is ￿exible and various ways exist to increase the lever-
age ratio￿s sensitivity. On the households￿ side, for instance, it would be possible to introduce real estate accu-
mulation and variable house prices. On the ￿rms￿ side, it would be possible to consider capital vintages, the idea
being that only the new capital goods (1,2... quarters old) can be resold by banks and therefore are collateralizable












27The subsequent reasoning would hold with any risk distribution (e.g. the lognormal distribution). This
particular class of distribution functions has three advantages. First, the capacity utilization rate￿s elasticity
to the leverage ratio simply writes 1+p. Second, the distribution collapses to the uniform distribution when
p =0 . (Note that the uniform distribution used in the model CR I was quite neutral regarding its implications
on dynamics). Third, this family of distributions is consistent with the observed distributions of a number of
￿nancial ratios, which may be skewed towards 0 (like distribution of the liquidity/total assets ratio).
28This feature is also present in the traditional models on the ￿nancial accelerator (Carsltr￿m & Fuerst [1997]
and Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist [1999], for example, who assumed a lognormal distribution) but, to my knowl-
edge, the role of the risk distribution has never been investigated.
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large variation ∆F(νt) in the number of ￿nanced ￿rms. The upshot is that small changes at the
microeconomic level may result in large aggregate disturbances. Table 5 and Figure 4 illustrate
this point. I considered two models with credit rationing, CR II and III, respectively with p =1
and p =1 .7. (The models CR I, II, and III are comparable because they all present the same
rate of capacity utilization at their steady state). Variances and autocorrelations move in the
expected way: The higher p, the stronger the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism. The model CR
III exhibits a more powerful accelerator than models CR I and II.
Table 5 ￿ Accelerator and Risk-Distributions29
ACF for output growth
σY γ1 γ2 γ3
CR II 0.013 0.120 0.099 0.084
CR III 0.016 0.170 0.151 0.132
This model generates both signi￿cant ampli￿cation and signi￿cant persistence. It therefore
performs better than the basic RBC model and better than the traditional models with the
￿nancial accelerator, which exhibit only either more ampli￿cation (Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist
[1999]) or more persistence (Carlstr￿m & Fuerst [1997]) than the basic RBC model.
4F i n a l R e m a r k s
This paper proposes a parsimonious and tractable way of modelling the role of credit rationing
in the business cycle, and describes a new ￿nancial accelerator mechanism. In contrast with the
traditional accelerator of Bernanke and Gertler, this accelerator does not go through the external
￿nance premium. It is independent from investment/interest rate elasticity, which is generally
29In order to have F(ν)=0 .95 at the steady state, I set γ = ￿ =0 .19 as p =1and γ = ￿ =0 .21 as p =1 .7.
Because there is no ap r i o r ireason why banks could seize proportionally more cash ￿ows than tangible assets
(and vice-versa) I considered the cases γ = ￿ only. One could ￿t the U.S. statistics even better by allowing γ >￿ .
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on the business cycle. Also, the loan-supply transmission channel described in this paper is
consistent with the empirical study of Kashyap, Stein & Wilcox [1993].
My main result is that the ￿nancial accelerator is stronger in the presence of quantity ra-
tioning than in the presence of price rationing on the credit market. The reason is that, by
creating a gap between potential and actual outputs, quantity rationing has a direct eﬀect on
the economic activity. Two quantitative conclusions warrant restatement. First, credit rationing
magni￿es the response of output to technology shocks. Second, the model replicates the empir-
ical fact that output growth displays positive autocorrelations at short horizons.
Another contribution of the paper is to demonstrate how questions about persistence and
ampli￿cation are intimately connected to the composition of the collateral. Basically, persistence
is imputable to the volume of tangible assets, whereas ampli￿cation comes from cash ￿ows
and asset prices. (The dynamic feedbacks generated by the latter are shown to be generating
ampli￿cation only).
There are several natural extensions of the current work. First, the model is amenable to
considering other shocks to the economy. For example, Carlstr￿m & Fuerst [2000], Bernanke &
Gertler [1999] recently examined the eﬀect of monetary shocks in related models. Second, the
model may provide a comprehensive framework to replicate the observed ￿ight-to-quality eﬀect,
that models with the traditional accelerator fail to reproduce (Fisher [1999]). Third, in the
current paper I have presented a very parsimonious framework which allows for considering a
large variety of collaterals, like real estates and house prices. The loan-supply channel version of
the accelerator must be viewed as a complement of, rather than a substitute to, the traditional
version. Therefore, a fourth natural extension is to incorporate price rationing into the model
in order to describe both the price and non-price channels underlying the ￿nancial accelerator
mechanism.
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6A p p e n d i x
The Implicit External Finance Premium
One peculiarity of my model is that agency costs are measured through the output gap, not
through an interest rate premium. As a result, the debtor interest rate is equal to the safe
interest rate and there is no facial premium. So, to make it easier the comparison between
the new and the traditional accelerators, I introduced the notion of ￿implicit external ￿nance
premium￿ (et). I de￿ne the latter as the ￿ctive premium that would make the economy have
ECB • Working Paper No 87 • November 2001 33the same factor demands under price rationing as it does under quantity rationing. It is thereby
possible to describe a ￿ctive economy with interest rate rationing, in which factor demands are
the same as in the economy with quantity rationing. In this ￿ctive economy, under-investment
of the same type as Bernanke & Gertler [1989] exists. Also, every ￿rm get external funds so that
the dynamics of actual ouput is the same as the dynamics of potential ouptut in the economy
with quantity rationing (Figure 1C). Table 2￿ below reports the equations that diﬀer from table
2 for such an economy.
Table 2￿ ￿ The Fictive Model with ￿Price Rationing￿30
2￿. yt = ct + it + E(1)kα
t+1‘1−α
t+1 + agency costs
3￿. yt = atkα
t ‘1−α
t
5￿. [at − E(1)(1 + rt)(1 + et)]αkα−1
t ‘1−α
t = rt + δ












By de￿nition of ￿interest rate rationing￿, all ￿rms must participate to the credit market. This
requires that the worse ￿rm￿s project has a positive return: at > (1 + rt)(1 + et) ∀t.O n ec a n
verify (by using equation 8￿) that this condition is satis￿ed whenever νt is close to one, which
is the case in the neighborhood of the steady state (ν =0 .95). As a result, the existence of a
positive external ￿nance premium implies under-investment (equations 5￿ and 6￿) but not capital
under-utilization: yt = Yt
31. At the steady state of this ￿ctive economy, the implicit external
￿nance premium is equal to 2% and the implied agency costs approximately amount to 1% of
the potential ouptut (instead of 5% in the economy with quantity rationing).






31Should the external ￿nance premium be very high, the entrepreneur ν =1would not be willing to undertake.
However, this case does not correspond to my de￿nition of price rationing (see the Introduction), since the
participation constraint of some borrowers would not be satis￿ed.
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Figures A1-A6 report the dynamics of the standard RBC model and the dynamics of the model
with intermediate goods I used as benchmark in the paper. These are the responses to a
technology shock, and parameters are the same as in Table 3. Basically, diﬀerences between the
two models are quantitative. Factors and output are more sensitive in the benchmark model
than in the standard RBC model. Factor demands increase more at the impact because they are
pulled up by the demand for ￿nal goods. The demand for ￿nal goods rises in period t owing to
the rise in period t+1demand for working capital goods. As a result, the interest rate is more
volatile at the impact. Despite the rise in the interest rate, consumption reacts stronger in the
benchmark model because of a stronger wealth eﬀect. In the economy with intermediate goods,
the wealth eﬀect is particularly tough because output is more persistent. This persistence is
mainly due to capital stock￿s behavior, which is stimulated by the decrease of the interest rate
back to its steady state.
Insert Figure A
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Figure 1: Benchmark and Credit Rationing
























































































































































Figure 3: Accelerator and ￿Dynamic Multiplier￿














































































































































































































































Figure A: The RBC Model and the Benchmark
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